The Delhi High Court witnessed an unprecedented legal moment when former Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, appearing in person, sought the recusal of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma from hearing the CBI’s appeal in the excise policy case. As the hearing concluded, Justice Sharma made a striking observation: “In my life for the first time somebody has asked me to recuse. But I learned a lot about it. I hope I can give a good judgment.” This rare remark, coming from a seasoned judge whose judicial career spans over three decades, has thrust the issue of judicial recusal—and the delicate balance between a litigant’s right to a fair hearing and a judge’s duty to decide—into the national spotlight.
The Backdrop: From Acquittal to Appeal
To understand the gravity of the recusal plea, one must first revisit the timeline of the excise policy case. On February 27, 2026, a special CBI court in Delhi delivered a significant verdict: it discharged Arvind Kejriwal, his former deputy Manish Sisodia, and 21 others in the Central Bureau of Investigation case relating to the now‑scrapped Delhi Excise Policy 2021‑22. The trial court found no material evidence to support allegations of corruption or criminal conspiracy, ruling that the prosecution had failed to cross even the prima facie threshold.
However, the CBI quickly signaled an appeal. On March 9, Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma’s bench took up the revision petition, issued notice to the discharged accused, and made certain observations suggesting that the trial court’s findings appeared “prima facie…erroneous.” She also stayed at the trial court’s recommendation for departmental action against the CBI’s investigating officer. For Kejriwal and his co‑accused, this swift intervention—coming after just a brief hearing—raised serious questions.
The Recusal Plea: Ten Grounds of Reasonable Apprehension
Kejriwal, choosing to argue his own case before the Delhi High Court on April 13, built his recusal application around ten specific grounds, anchored in the well‑established legal principle that even a reasonable apprehension of bias—not proof of actual bias—can justify a judge’s recusal.
His arguments rested on several pillars:
1. Strong Prior Observations
Kejriwal contended that Justice Sharma had, in earlier orders concerning his arrest challenge and bail pleas of co‑accused including Manish Sisodia and K. Kavitha, made observations so conclusive that they amounted to a virtual judgment. “I was almost declared guilty. I was almost declared corrupt. Only the sentence was left to be pronounced,” he told the court.
2. Disparity Between Trial Court and High Court
He contrasted the trial court’s discharge order—delivered after three months of day‑to‑day hearings and examination of over 40,000 pages of evidence—with the High Court’s March 9 order. “The order that the trial court had passed after a full day of hearing, after reading 40,000 pages of documents, was declared erroneous by this court after just a five‑minute hearing,” he argued.
3. Alleged Ideological Association
Kejriwal pointed out that Justice Sharma had attended four events organized by the Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad (ABAP), a lawyers’ body widely considered an affiliate of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). He submitted that since his party openly opposes that ideology, her attendance created a reasonable apprehension in his mind that the bench might be more receptive to the other side.
4. Pattern of Orders Favoring CBI and ED
Kejriwal alleged a discernible trend in Justice Sharma’s orders: “Whatever CBI and ED argue is accepted by Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma.” He claimed that every prayer made by the prosecuting agencies had been turned into a judgment.
5. Unusual Pace of Proceedings
Kejriwal also argued that his matter was being heard at an unusually accelerated pace compared to other criminal revisions, including those involving opposition leaders, which further deepened his apprehension.
Crucially, he invoked the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987), which holds that the proper approach for a judge is not to ask oneself “Am I biased?” but to look at the mind of the litigant—whether a fair‑minded, informed observer could reasonably apprehend bias.
CBI’s Counter: ‘Frivolous, Vexatious and Baseless’
Opposing the recusal application, the CBI, represented by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, termed the plea as “frivolous, vexatious and baseless,” arguing that it was founded on conjectures and aimed at undermining the institution of the judiciary.
The CBI made several key submissions:
Attending legal seminars cannot be a ground for recusal when the topic was not political. Mehta pointed out that even sitting in Supreme Court and other High Court judges had attended events organized by the same bar association.
Dissatisfaction with interim observations does not justify recusal, and allowing such applications would set a dangerous precedent of “bench hunting.”
Interim observations are tentative in nature and cannot be construed as evidence of bias against any party.
Mehta also accused Kejriwal of “theatrics,” remarking that the court was “not a forum for theatrics” when Kejriwal expressed his intention to argue the recusal application personally.
The Courtroom Drama: Key Exchanges That Defined the Hearing
The hearing was not merely a legal argument, but a sustained face‑off, marked by direct questions from the bench and equally pointed assertions from Kejriwal.
A Light Moment: When Kejriwal said this was his first appearance before the bench, Justice Sharma replied, “I hope you never have to come here again.”
On Political Bias: Justice Sharma bluntly asked Kejriwal if he was insinuating political bias. Kejriwal avoided a direct allegation but maintained that the sequence of events raised a genuine apprehension.
On RSS Link: When Kejriwal pointed to her attendance at ABAP events, Justice Sharma responded with a pointed question: whether any political or ideological statement had been made at those events, or whether they were purely legal programmes.
The Remark on Advocacy: After Kejriwal concluded his hour‑long submissions, Justice Sharma told him: “You argued well. Aap vakeel ban sakte hai.” Kejriwal responded that he had already found his “calling” and was happy with it.
The ‘First In My Life’ Moment
As the hearing drew to a close after nearly four and a half hours, Justice Sharma dictated the order of reserving judgment. Her concluding words captured the significance of the moment:
“I learnt a lot about recusal jurisprudence. For the first time in my life someone has asked me to recuse. I learned a lot. I hope I will give a good judgment.”
This statement, delivered with judicial composure, was remarkable for two reasons. First, it underscored that Justice Sharma, despite her long career—entering the judiciary at the age of 24 and serving as Principal District and Sessions Judge before her elevation to the Delhi High Court in March 2022—had never before faced a recusal request. Second, it reflected her willingness to engage with recusal jurisprudence, indicating that she would approach the matter with the seriousness it deserved.
Fresh Affidavit: New Grounds Emerge
The legal battle did not end with the April 13 hearing. On April 14, Kejriwal filed an additional affidavit before the Delhi High Court, raising two fresh grounds to strengthen his recusal application.
1. Conflict of Interest: Judge’s Family Ties to the Centre
Kejriwal alleged a direct and serious appearance of conflict of interest, pointing out that Justice Sharma’s children are empaneled as panel counsel for the Union of India. According to the affidavit:
The judge’s son, Ishaan Sharma, is a Group ‘A’ Panel Counsel for the Supreme Court, while her daughter, Shambhavi Sharma, is a government pleader for the Delhi High Court and a Group ‘C’ Panel Counsel for the apex court.
Citing data procured through the RTI Act, the affidavit noted that 2,487 cases were marked to the judge’s son in 2023, 1,784 cases in 2024, and 1,633 cases in 2025.
The allocation of cases to this panel counsel is overseen by the Solicitor General of India, who is representing the CBI and opposing Kejriwal’s recusal in the present case.
The affidavit submitted that these circumstances give rise to a “direct and serious appearance of conflict of interest,” and that in a “politically sensitive prosecution” involving a “principal political opponent of the ruling party,” the apprehension becomes “direct, grave and impossible for me to ignore.”
2. Denial of Fair Hearing
Kejriwal also claimed that after he concluded his submissions and left court at around 3:45 pm, the proceedings continued beyond normal court hours until after 7 pm without granting him an opportunity to respond to the prosecution arguments. He argued that this effectively denied him a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to advance his rejoinder.
The Larger Legal Principles at Stake
The recusal controversy raises fundamental questions about judicial ethics and the administration of justice in politically charged cases.
The ‘Justice Must Be Seen to Be Done’ Principle
Indian law has long recognized that justice must not only be done but must appear to be done. The Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India established the objective test: whether a reasonable, fair‑minded observer would apprehend bias. The judge’s own subjective belief in their impartiality is irrelevant.
The Duty to Sit vs. The Duty to Recuse
There exists an inherent tension between a judge’s duty to decide cases assigned to them and the obligation to recuse when circumstances give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court has held that a judge may recuse legitimate reasons, but recusal cannot be made to appease the perceptions of a party merely because they are dissatisfied with adverse orders.
Family Connections and Perceived Bias
Kejriwal’s fresh affidavit raises a particularly sensitive issue: whether the empanelment of a judge’s children as government counsel, combined with the allocation of thousands of cases through a system overseen by the very law officers appearing against the litigant, creates an appearance of bias. Indian courts have not yet definitively ruled on this precise scenario, making Justice Sharma’s eventual order on the recusal plea potentially path‑breaking.
What Happens Next?
Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma has reserved her order on the recusal applications filed by Kejriwal and other accused. The court has directed all parties to file short submissions, not exceeding three pages.
The key questions before the court are:
Does Kejriwal’s “reasonable apprehension of bias” meet the legal threshold established by the Supreme Court?
Does a judge’s attendance at events organized by a lawyers’ body with perceived ideological affiliations warrant recusal in a politically sensitive prosecution?
Does the empanelment of a judge’s children as government counsel, with substantial allocation of cases, create a disqualifying conflict of interest?
Was Kejriwal denied a fair hearing when proceedings continued beyond court hours without affording him an opportunity to respond?
If Justice Sharma rules against recusal, the hearing on the CBI’s revision petition against the discharge order will proceed before her. If she recuses, the case will be assigned to a different bench, potentially delaying proceedings but arguably reinforcing public confidence in judicial impartiality.
Why This Case Matters
The Kejriwal recusal plea transcends the immediate legal dispute. It touches upon:
The credibility of the judiciary in high‑profile, politically charged cases
The evolving jurisprudence on recusal in India, particularly concerning perceived ideological and familial conflicts
The rights of litigants to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal
The boundaries between a judge’s public engagements and a litigant’s confidence in the bench
Justice Sharma’s eventual order—whether she recuses or not—will be closely scrutinized not only by legal scholars but by the broader public. Her acknowledgment that this is the “first time in my life” she has been asked to recuse adds a layer of historical significance to the proceedings. Whatever her decision, it will likely shape recusal jurisprudence in India for years to come.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court now awaits Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma’s judgment on whether she will continue to hear the CBI’s appeal in the excise policy case or step aside. Kejriwal, who has already been discharged by the trial court after a thorough examination of evidence, has staked his claim to a fair hearing on the principle that justice must be seen to be done. The CBI, on the other hand, has warned against allowing recusal applications to become a tool for “bench hunting.”
In the end, the outcome will rest on a single, critical question: Would a fair‑minded, informed observer, fully apprised of the facts, reasonably apprehend that justice might not be done if Justice Sharma continues to preside over the case?
The answer to that question will determine not only the fate of the excise policy appeal but also the contours of judicial recusal law in India for the future.
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